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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
By

SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE*

In 1973, an unprecedented inflow of foreign investment into the United
States caught American policy-makers and the general public totally unprepared for the experience. In that year alone, foreign direct investment
(FDI) increased by $3.42 billion, more than a three-fold increase over the
previous year, representing a 23 per cent rise in the aggregate foreign direct
investment in the United States.'
In addition to direct investment, portfolio equity investment amounted
to $24.8 billion, for a total long-term equity investment in 1973 of $43
billion.' The total for 1974, the beginning of the recent global recession,
showed similar growth. FDI for 1974 grew by $3.46 billion to a grand total
3
of $21.7 billion, an annual rate of 19%.
These government figures have been the subject of dispute. They do not
include real estate investments, since these traditionally have been considered a local activity and any regulation thereof, such as title registration,
has been at the local level.' If rumors about large alien real estate purchases are confirmed, this omission must be considered of major significance. 5 Furthermore, the information is gathered on a sampling process
based on a benchmark study taken in 1959.6 Private estimates have been
much higher than the official figures. Without accurate information gathering programs, policy-makers do not have some of the most basic information, such as aggregate long-term FDI in the United States.
In this discussion of the issue of foreign investment in the United States,
it must be made clear that we are working with rough approximations, and
new information conceivably could shift the focus of attention. The lack
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University Law School (J.D., 1952). Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism. Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
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of adequate data is a serious one which will be analyzed later, but foreign
investment in the United States appears to be significantly greater than
initial government statistics indicate, and this fact must be taken into
consideration as policy options for dealing with growing foreign investment
are considered.
The issue of the volume of long-term foreign investment in the United
States is of more than academic interest. Opponents of action against FDI
have predicated some of their arguments on the relatively small size of
such investment.7 If that investment is shown to be far larger than they
had anticipated, their arguments may be weakened.
It would be facile to dismiss the concerns about FDI as being groundless.' The lack of accurate data and absence of solid academic research on
FDI in the United States only bolster the contention that American policymakers and the public lack a great deal of necessary and desirable information about foreign investment. It would be far wiser to adopt a position of
economic agnosticism insofar as FDI is concerned and to suspend judgment about the aggregate domestic economic impact of FDI.9 Such a position does not in any way seek to contradict the pro-investment views by
many economists, but rather acknowledges some of the potentially valid
complaints about FDI, some of which may not be solely economic.
At least one authority has suggested that foreign multinational enterprises which invest in the United States may have motivations different
from American firms which invest overseas.' 0 If this view is accurate, FDI
in the United States should be treated as a special case to which analysis
of outward American FDI may not be applicable.
This article will examine the political implications of FDI in the United
States, with particular emphasis on the potential for Congressional action.
The determination of whether FDI is "good" or "bad" is beyond the scope
of this article, since no simple answer can possibly be definitive. Each
situation differs, and one's attitudes towards FDI reflect value judgments,
political and economic biases, and a multitude of subjective perceptions.
Increasingly, it has become clear that the issue is not whether to have
FDI in a given country. Even some centrally planned economies welcome
extensive activities by multinational enterprises. Rather the question ap7. Hearings on Foreign Investments in the United States Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 10
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Foreign Investments]; COUNCIL ON INT'L ECONOMIC
POLICY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 59 n.2 (1974).

8. Note, U.S. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: Current Developments and the
Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 618 (1975).
9. Benjamin Cohen, Hearings on Foreign Investment Legislation Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 142 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Foreign Investment Legislationl.
10.

A. SAMETZ, THE FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL COMPANY IN THE U.S. 10 (1973).
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pears to be how a host country can maximize the benefits it can obtain
from FDI while minimizing any actual or potential drawbacks from such
investment.
Direct investment traditionally has been defined as "one which gives the
investor operating control of the business firm involved, as opposed to
indirect or portfolio investment, which does not provide operational control."" Control may be obtained by starting a new venture or by taking
over an existing business entity.
Prior to the passage of the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, 2 direct
investment in a corporation was defined as control directly or indirectly of
25% or more of the voting shares." Anomalously, the definition of control
for American investors overseas was 10% of the voting shares. As a result
of the passage of that Act, this difference was reconciled, and a standard
10% definition was applied to both inward and outward investment.' 4
The concept of "control," which distinguishes direct from portfolio investment, is crucial but elusive. Different conditions may dictate whether
10% or 25% ownership constitutes control, since 10% of the stock conceivably could be the dominant bloc of stock in a firm. The public controversy
which erupted over foreign investment in the United States has focused
exclusively on foreign direct investment in which "control" was, or is, a
factor. By and large, foreign portfolio investment has escaped criticism
while the public wrath has fallen on those companies in which
management is considered to be foreign-controlled. Therefore, this article
will deal only with foreign direct investment, since this is the form of
foreign investment which has aroused public concern.
I.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Any scheme for the regulation or control of FDI would have to fall into
one of three categories: multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral. Of the three,
the most difficult to structure would be a multilateral regime, since it
would involve several countries, presumably with different institutions,
motivations, and objectives. The easiest to initiate would be a unilateral
program, since any sufficiently motivated country could enact a program
designed to thwart FDI.
A multilateral program by its nature suggests one of two things: a pattern of non-discrimination among the acceding parties, or, if the objective
is to control investment, a carefully articulated program with explicit rules
11.
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12. 15 U.S.C.A. §78b note (Supp. 1976).
13. Hearings on Foreign Investments, supra note 7 at 18-19.
14. Id. at 13.
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and exceptions. The Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements'" is an
example of the former.
It has been suggested that a system like the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade be established for investment,"8 but in light of deep
divisions between the rich and poor nations and controversies among the
wealthier countries themselves, it is highly doubtful that such a code could
be developed, much less adopted. 7
Work toward guidelines for international FDI has proceeded in existing
multilateral forums. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is currently developing voluntary guidelines for multinational enterprises, while a number of U.N. agencies are working on
various issues, such as technology transfer. 18 The thrust of the efforts of the
United Nations is in large part political in character; the emphasis is
primarily on the achievement of certain political and economic goals rather
than solely on the establishment of a regulatory regime for multinationals.
The OECD Code has fallen into general disuse. The rapid changes in the
global economy promise more turmoil and confrontation between the rich
and poor, and the development of a consensus under such conditions is
extremely unlikely.
One of the traditional modes of dealing with FDI has been through
bilaterally negotiated treaties. Usually those treaties of "friendship, commerce, and navigation" with America's traditional trading partners guarantee full national treatment, conferring on foreign direct investment, once
it is made, a status equivalent to a domestic investment. Bilateral treaties
with other nations grant a variety of trading and investment privileges.
There is little doubt that unilateral action by the United States would
violate a number of these treaties if FDI were singled out for discriminatory
limitations.' 9 There would be no legal impediment to doing so, however,
since congressional action would supersede any existing treaty.
While the United States has sought to avoid bilateral FDI controls, it
has also sought to use bilateral agreements to defuse the issue of foreigngovernment FDI. Informal agreement has been reached with Saudi Arabia
and Iran for advance consultations before major governmental investment
is undertaken. 0
15.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERAILIZATION

(Aug. 1973 ed.).
16. Goldberg and Kindleberger, Towards a GATT for Investment: A Proposalfor Supervision of the InternationalCorporation,2 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 295 (1970).
17. Keohane and Oooms, The Multinational Firm and International Regulation, INT'l,
ORGANIZATION 197 (Winter, 1975).
18. THE ECONOMIST 68 (Jan. 24, 1976).
19. Hearings on the Foreign Investment Act of 1975 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29 (1975).
20. Hearings on ForeignInvestment Legislation, supra note 9 at 55.
OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
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Unilateral action is the easiest course to follow, since it does not require
the acquiescence of foreign governments, and in lieu of an international
regulatory regime, most countries have resorted to unilateral controls.',
Proposals in the United States have ranged from limitations on the acquisition of any stocks above a ceiling, to a "do-nothing" attitude.
The development, enactment, and implementation of coherent unilateral FDI regulation requires, above all, an evaluation of costs and benefits
and a clear idea of the objectives of regulation. Neither of these elements
has been adequately discussed in public debate on FDI.
II.

CURRENT UNITED STATES POLICY

Current American policy on foreign investment can be characterized as
"liberal." With few exceptions, foreign investors are treated in a manner
similar to domestic investors once an investment is made. Foreigners generally are not singled out for special discriminatory or preferential treatment. The exceptions to this policy are in those areas which have been
deemed vital to national security." Such a policy raises interesting conceptual problems, however. Strong arguments could be made even under this
policy to control or prohibit certain foreign investments in banking and
finance, agriculture and food distribution, and defense industries, among
others.
There seem to be no legal impediments to congressional enactment of
selected additional restrictions, particularly if such prohibitions arguably
could fit under the rubric of national defense, for which allowance is made
21.

There are several extensive discussions of foreign government legal treatment of

FDI. See 2 INTERIM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 1, appendix X (October,

1975); Hearings on the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 Before the Subcomm. on
Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
at 84 (1974); M. Kennedy, The Climatefor Investment A broad (Office of International Investment, Dep't of State, 1974), reprinted in Hearings on Foreign Investments in the United
States Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 86 (1974); SANFORD AND COSTA, INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, Mar. 29, 1974) reprinted in Hearings on Foreign Investment in the
United States Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on

Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 375 (1974). Chamber of Commerce, The Climate
for Investment Abroad (Sept. 1974). Generally these studies show that the industrialized
nations consider themselves to be liberal and non-discriminatory in their attitude towards
foreign investment. Most of these countries do not have explicit policies embodied in foreign
investment laws although there are variations from country-to-country. Canada and Japan
in particular are more restrictive in that they formally screen new investment and have
specific investment laws. France, among the Western European nations, regulates and
screens most foreign direct investment. The others, according to the Kennedy study, maintain at least some form of reporting and monitoring mechanism of domestic investments.
Many non-Western countries totally ban any FDI in their economies.
22.
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in bilateral treaties. Further restrictions on inward investment need not
violate the letter of current U.S. policy, but the appearance and the psychological impact of a retreat from an open, even-handed policy apparently disturbs the Administration.?
The United States, home of the largest international investors, has traditionally been a staunch advocate of free capital flows and is a strong
supporter of the OECD Code. Administration spokesmen have incessantly
stressed that the United States has the most to lose if the world were to
embark on a wave of investment protectionism. 4
By and large, U.S. policy on foreign investment has been more liberal
and open than the policies of our industrial allies, 5 whose programs range
from complicated prohibitions to extensive monitoring. Executive
opposition to legislative proposals arises not from the belief that the proposals, if enacted, would result in an inequitable disparity in treatment of
foreign investment (although this may happen in some cases), but rather
from the fear that any reversal in traditional U.S. policy would be perceived as a weakening in the American commitment to free capital flows.
This uneasiness is not necessarily misplaced, although it is hypothetical.
Certainly the activities of some multinational enterprises have come under
serious attack.2 Moreover, in some multilateral organizations such as the
United Nations, efforts are underway to develop international codes or
guidelines for the regulation of multinational enterprises. However, while
the overseas reaction must be of vital interest to the United States, domestic American policy should not be predicated solely on the United States'
international investment position if there are legitimate grounds for economic and security concerns.
Granted the major premises of traditional American policy towards FDI,
that policy is still crude, since it makes little distinction between different
types of investment. The thrust of that policy has been negative in the
sense that politicians and bureaucrats have reacted rather than responded
creatively to the growth of foreign investment to stimulate the economy,
improve the balance of payments, or update antiquated regulations.
Investment can take place in several different forms and can have significantly different impacts. A totally new venture can create jobs, while the
simple purchase of equity may simply add to the domestic capital stock.
A direct investment also may introduce superior technology, bring in new
Hearings on Foreign Investment Legislation, supra note 9 at 51, 81.
Id. at 82.
25. See sources cited supra at note 19. Appendix X in the INTERIM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REPORT concentrated on the FDI of industrialized nations.
26. See Muller, Poverty is the Product, FOREIGN POLIcY 71 (No. 13, Winter 1974). See also
Musgrave, Direct Investment Abroad and the Multinationals: Effects on the United States
Economy, prepared for the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, XIX (1975).
23.
24.
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management, or invigorate an older firm. In short, certain types of investments, such as those which create jobs or employ superior technology, can
bring clear, substantive benefits to an economy. Our current, even-handed
policy is undiscriminating and unrefined, and Administration spokesmen
are reluctant to take into account the costs and benefits of individual
investments. While it may be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
between different investments, there is no evidence that Executive policymakers have even considered the possibility of doing so.
Although FDI has existed in the United States for decades without
known adverse impact, changes in the world economy dictate a constant
re-evaluation of the nation's needs and objectives and the role of FDI
relative to those objectives. Traditional policy should be the starting point
of that review, not the end. The recent furor over FDI has served a constructive purpose in subjecting America's FDI policy to intense and critical
public scrutiny and dissolving the complacency which enveloped business,
labor, government, and the general public concerning this economic
development.
A.

Administration Position

The current Administration position on FDI reflects a comfortable
consensus among the various departments and agencies with mild differences in nuance. Generally, there is broad agreement on the desirability
of maintaining the current U.S. policy of minimal restrictions on the
theory that the free market is the best means for achieving maximum
efficiency in the allocation of capital resources.17 Current policy discounts
the threat from the oil-exporting countries and hypothesizes that enactment of American restrictions would have a deleterious effect on American
investments abroad.
Administration spokesmen have repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to the free market and have warned that the imposition of restrictions would terminate the benefits flowing from foreign investment. Not
only does the Administration oppose outright restrictions, but it has also
opposed the establishment of a permanent monitoring mechanism as premature."
The Administration view clearly represents a national constituency
which has an important stake in free, unfettered capital movements. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Administration's position endorses the status
quo-that is, relatively minimal restrictions on incoming investment-it
closely adheres to this nation's traditional policy.
While the Administration has strongly opposed enactment of additional
controls, it has not been adverse to the need for more comprehensive infor27.
28.

Hearings on the Foreign Investment Act. of 1975, supra note 17 at 21-22.
Hearings on Foreign Investment Legislation, supra note 9 at 51-52.
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mation on foreign investment in the United States. Consequently Executive representatives endorsed S. 2840, which became the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974.9 This Act authorized the first major study of
foreign investment since 1959 and provided for more far-reaching and
comprehensive information than the 1959 project. That the bill was introduced to meet an obvious deficiency in information was clear and should
have been sufficient to induce Administration support. However, the fear
that a more onerous and restrictive bill might be forthcoming also could
have had a part in attracting Administration support.
Since the FDI issue first came to prominence, the Administration's position has remained relatively consistent. However, the decision-making
structure within the Executive has evolved considerably. In its early period, the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State and the
Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) exerted the greatest
influence in the development of an FDI policy. Each of these agencies
represented a different constituency and had a slightly different orientation and concern. Treasury tended to be theoretical and was concerned
about monetary affairs. State, on the other hand, was concerned about the
international impact of efforts to curb foreign direct investment, while
Commerce was heavily influenced by the business community. CIEP,
probably the most balanced of the agencies in terms of its ideological
orientation, was not as heavily influenced since it has no constituency per
se as do the line agencies.
Although CIEP did much of the original research and work on this issue,
it has gradually lost its influence on this and other international economic
subjects. 0 Since the resignation of its last permanent director, William
Eberle, more than a year ago, CIEP has been headed by an acting director.
The leading role has been assumed by the Treasury Department, a stronghold of the free-market, free-trade sentiment. This position was confirmed
by the appointment of the Secretary of the Treasury as head of the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment, which consists of the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic
Policy." Such power appears to derive not from the particular expertise of
the Secretary or the Department-although the Treasury does follow capital movements-but rather from the affinity of the President for the economic views of the Treasury Secretary. In view of the fact that it is foreign
29. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b note (Supp. 1976).
30. Hearings on the International Economic Policy Act of 1975 Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1975).
31. Executive Order 11858, May 7, 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 9, 1975).
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direct investment-not foreign portfolio investment-which has been politically troublesome, it would have been more natural for the responsibility
to have been lodged with the Secretary of Commerce, whose responsibilities include domestic corporate activities.
The creation of a high level unit to review foreign investment was one
facet of the Administration's four-point program. In addition to the appointment of the interagency committee, the Administration did the
following:
-established an Office of Foreign Investment in the United States
within the Department of Commerce to gather and analyze information and to support the interagency committee;
-initiated a program to improve information operations, principally through the Office of Foreign Investment in the United
States; and
-obtained agreements from some-though not all-surplus
OPEC states for advance consultations with the United States
government before significant governmental investments are made
32
in this country.
Before the Congress, the Executive has continued to oppose enactment
of any further limitations, although in principal it supports the concept of
additional disclosure from all investors, both domestic and foreign. 3 The
Administration has expressed the desire also to wait for the issuance of the
final reports on foreign direct and portfolio investment before proceeding
3
with further disclosure or monitoring programs4.
Pursuant to the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, four reports on
FDI were issued by the Executive agencies in 1975: the interim reports on
portfolio and direct investment by the Departments of the Treasury and
Commerce respectively and two reports on information gathering released
under CIEP auspices.3 5 As a major part of its program to cope with pressures for restrictions, the Administration is relying heavily on the assumption that the data collected will show no reason for alarm. Since it defends
32. Hearings on the Foreign Investment Act of 1975, supra note 19 at 22.
33. Id.at 26. Ray Garrett, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
supported those provisions in S. 425 relating to further disclosure of equity ownership although he also contended that the Commission had sufficient rule-making authority. Id. at
98.
34. Hearings on Foreign Investment Legislation, supra note 9 at 51-52.
35. INTERIM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 1; INTERIM REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2; COUNCIL ON
INT'L ECONOMIC POLICY, REPORT ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY SOURCES OF DATA ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct.

1975), reprintedas Appendix XIII; 2

INTERIM FOREIGN

DIRECT INVESTMENT REPORT; COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

(March, 1975).
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the status quo, the Administration appears to be in a stronger position visa-vis critics of FDI.
B.

CongressionalResponse

In contrast to the Administration's relatively homogenous, consistent
position, the Congress responded to the growth of foreign investment in a
hesitant fashion. Legislation in the 93rd and 94th Congresses ranges on a
broad continuum from the highly restrictive to straightforward data collection."
Congress is often criticized for being remote from and unresponsive to
the public, but the truth is quite different. Members of Congress have been
much more sensitive to local and state constituency pressures on this issue
than the Administration has been, and this fact has been reflected in the
attempt of Congress to deal with a novel issue. Foreign direct investment
is a regional phenomenon, with demands for action varying from area to
area. Moreover, FDI is actively sought by many state development officials, 3 and a Member's willingness to introduce legislation or his interest
in legislation will be influenced by the experience of his district with FDI
as well as by his national perspective.
It is misleading to speak of a "congressional response" as though Congress were a monolithic and cohesive body. Under our system of government, the only legally valid congressional response is a public law, even
if, as a strategic matter, one must pay attention to statements by Members
and subsequent media coverage. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the congressional response as expressed in public law has been moderate and
reasonable. Of the plethora of bills introduced in the 93rd Congress, only
two proposals were enacted into law. The most significant was the Foreign
Investment Study Act of 1974, which authorized a complete survey of
36. The principal bills introduced in the 93rd Congress included: H.R. 8951 (DentGaydos); H.R. 12040 (Moss); H.R. 13897 (Roe); H.R. 16848 (Wyman); H.R. 16932 (Gunter);
S. 2840 (Inouye) (now P.L. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974), 15 U.S.C.A. §78b note (Supp. 1976)),
S. 3955 (Metzenbaum). Bills and resolutions introduced in the 94th Congress are as follows:
H.R. Res. 249 (Regula); H.R. Res. 755 (Dent); H.R. 411 (Fish); H.R. 418 (Fish); H.R. 945
(Roe); H.R. 954 (Roe); H.R. 1573 (Ashbrook); H.R. 2052 (Stark); H.R. 2329 (Minish); H.R.
2757 (Talcott); H.R. 2867 (Brademas); H.R. 3085 (Helstoski); H.R. 3398 (Broomfield); H.R.
3401 (Broomfield); H.R. 3811 (Wolff); H.R. 4492 (Burleson); H.R. 4677 (Dent): H.R. 5491
(Solarz); H.R. 5617 (St. Germain); H.R. 5887 (Roe); H.R. 5888 (Roe); H.R. 5962 (Ottinger);
H.R. 6857 (Brodhead); H.R. 6907 (Eshleman); H.R. 7023 (Carney); H.R. 7024 (Carney); H.R.
7578 (Carney); H.R. 7589 (Carney); H.R. 10637 (Moss); H.R. 12103 (Rees); S. 329 (Scott);
S. 425 (Williams); S. 953 (Stevenson); S. 958 (Proxmire, by request); S. 995 (Williams); S.
1132 (Sparkman); S. 1303 (Inouye); S. 1303 (Stevens amendment No. 393); S. 1461 (Humphrey); and S. 2839 (Inouye).
37. Hearings on Foreign Investments, supra note 7 at 199. The Department of Commerce
maintains an office called the Domestic Investment Services Staff, which was established in
1961 to promote inward investment to improve the balance of payments. Its recent mission
has been to help states attract FDI for development purposes.
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inward direct and portfolio investment to be completed by late April,
1976.38 The second was an amendment to the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, requiring the Administrator to report on foreign influence
and ownership in the energy sector and to monitor this investment."
Several features of the political climate in which these measures were
enacted deserve attention. While there were a large number of restrictive
bills introduced in the House, there were none in the Senate. Both bills
that eventually passed originated in the Senate. Despite the urgent concern expressed by some Representatives, none of the restrictive bills received a hearing. Some criticisms of those bills may be thoroughly justified, but the public utterances of some Members should not belie the fact
that Congress was most constructive and deliberate in its approach. The
two measures finally enacted were congressional initiatives which the
Administration supported. The Study Act, in particular, met a need which
the Administration conceded exists but on which there had been no
40
executive action.
Legislative proposals in the 94th Congress fall into similar categories:
informational and restrictive. Many of the bills show an increased sophistication and deal with specific issues rather than strike indiscriminately at
FDI. An example of this genre is S. 995, which focuses on foreign government direct investment, an issue which is one of the principal concerns of
41
the Executive.
Naturally, not all the bills deserve equal attention. Moreover, evaluating
the prospects for legislation necessarily involves a large element of personal
judgment. Inasmuch as there have been no hearings on House measures
in the 94th Congress, the focus of this analysis will be on Senate proposals,
with the possibility that the House may act later on some bills. Of the
Senate proposals, five appear at this time to be important enough to be
mentioned or have favorable prospects.
S. 425, introduced by Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, would
amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require notification by foreign investors of proposed acquisition of equity securities of United States
companies and to authorize the President to prohibit any such acquisition
as appropriate for national security reasons. Hearings on this bill have
been concluded.
S. 958, introduced by Senator William Proxmire at the request of the
Federal Reserve Board, provides for federal regulation of foreign banks
establishing, acquiring, operating, or controlling banks, branches, and
agencies in the United States. The legislation is designed to end the dispar38.
39.
40.
41.

15 U.S.C.A.
15 U.S.C.A.
Hearings on
Hearingson

§78b note (Supp. 1976).
§761 (Supp. 1976).
Foreign Investments, supra note 7 at 40.
Foreign Investment Legislation, supra note 9 at 55.
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ity in treatment of foreign and domestic banks. Hearings were held in
January, 1976, and they have been concluded. A bill embodying similar
provisions may receive House consideration soon, but chances for passage
are unclear.
S. 953, introduced by Senator Adlai Stevenson, Jr., would amend the
Export Administration Act of 196911 to clarify and strengthen the authority
of the Secretary of Commerce to take action in the case of restrictive trade
practices or boycotts. While this bill, as originally introduced, was only
tangentially related to FDI, it has been amended to include a provision to
amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to enhance disclosure of equity
ownership by both domestic and foreign investors. This latter provision is
an outgrowth of S. 425, on which action has been deferred.
S. 1303, which I introduced, would authorize the establishment of a
Foreign Investment Administration within the Department of Commerce
headed by a director appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The director would be authorized to establish procedures for the submission by foreign investors of information on significant
investments in U.S. companies. The bill also sets the criteria for the establishment of reporting requirements. Hearings on the bill have been concluded.
Finally, S. 2839, which I also introduced, would authorize the Secretary
of Commerce to collect and publish information on inward and outward
investment and to take periodic surveys. The objective of this bill is to
provide unambiguous authority for the collection of data which is needed
for policy-making purposes but whose compilation may be legally questionable under the Bretton Woods Agreements Act.4 3 This bill, if enacted,
would cure a serious deficiency in existing authority and consequently has
received Administration endorsement."

III.

DEVELOPING

A

CONTEMPORARY

FDI POLICY

The American experience with recent foreign direct investment provides
little guide as to the appropriate approach to analyzing the impact of
foreign direct investment on the domestic economy and on our national
security. As far as we know, there have been no shocking examples of
untoward managerial behavior, no acquisitions of important defense con42.
43.

50 U.S.C.A. App. §2401 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
22 U.S.C.A. §286f (Rev. 1964). For a complete discussion of this problem, see Hearings

on Information Management by Federal Regulatory Agencies Before the Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting, and Management of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 46-61 (1975).
44. Testimony by Gerald Parsky, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, Senate Comm. on Commerce, February 23, 1976.
The hearings have not been printed at the time of this writing.
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tractors, no attempt by Arab investors to gain control of major industrial
firms, and no evidence that FDI has had a detrimental impact on firms
acquired or has compromised the national sovereignty.
A restatement of this litany, however, begs a more sophisticated analysis
of the issues raised by FDI in the United States. In view of the dearth of
detailed academic and investigative research into this issue, is the failure
to detect the potential adverse effects due to a lack of adequate information, an analytical framework, and measuring tools? Can we ever develop
a set of proper analytical tools to assess the costs and benefits of FDI, or
are there too many elusive factors which cannot be quantified? Furthermore, even if an investor's immediate behavior were not detrimental to the
corporation or to employees' welfare, are there activities nevertheless
which could work to the detriment of the national interest-however that
may be defined-over the long run?
The congressional decision-making process compounds the difficulty of
dealing with FDI issues. The formulation, development, enactment, and
implementation of any kind of policy with controversial ramifications can
be painfully slow. Even the non-controversial Foreign Investment Study
Act of 1974 required ten months to become public law. While procedures
can undoubtedly be expedited, the deliberative pace of the legislative process must be taken into consideration in evaluating any strategy to cope
with what may emerge as a sudden, volatile issue. The legislative process
works best when it encourages thorough discussion and review, and in some
cases it may not lend itself well to emergency situations.
In devising a strategy to deal with FDI, the Congress necessarily must
plan for a wide spectrum of possibilities, some of which may be very remote. The general provisions must be sufficiently flexible to take into
account hypothetical situations lest we face a situation in which a public
law cannot meet unplanned and unusual developments. Therefore, blanket criticism of congressional concern with extreme situations is misplaced. A rational FDI policy should be judged in terms of its relationship
to previous experience, current developments, projected potential, and
hypothetical possibilities informed by national security and national economic considerations. The order of priority of these different factors may
be subject to debate, but all are essential to an FDI policy, and the last
consideration cannot and should not be dismissed.
The need for a more detailed and structured FDI policy would diminish
considerably if further FDI were to end or significantly decrease. No one,
however, has assumed this, and the prospect for further FDI is bright if
for no other reason than reinvestment by existing domestic subsidiaries.45
45.
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Political hostility is directly related to both aggregate volume and the type
of FDI. Under the assumption that the world economy recovers and that
no further significant controls on investment capital flows are imposed in
Europe, Japan, or Canada-the major sources of FDI-it does not appear
realistic to forecast a significant long-term reduction in FDI in the United.
States.
In its defense of current U.S. policy, the Administration has repeatedly
stressed that foreign investors have acted rationally to maximize their
return or to meet other corporate needs such as preserving existing markets. It is logical to assume, therefore, that foreign investment will occur
principally in the most promising firms-those in which Americans have
a technological lead or which are unusually profitable or productive or
which are underpriced relative to replacement value. Furthermore, it
would be reasonable to assume that some of these investments may be on
a large scale similar to the recent acquisition of Copperweld by Societe
Imetal for $200 million. By the same token, however, it is also apparent
that the potential for conflict is very high in these areas. The opposition
by local governmental and labor interests in the Copperweld case was well
documented." It is also unclear whether the national interest is served by
foreign acquisition of American firms which would not benefit significantly
from foreign capital, technology, or managerial talent. Acquisition of innovative, high-technology domestic firms by foreign investors gives rise to
interesting and troubling questions.
Very little attention has been given to the position of organized labor on
this issue even though unions have evinced a strong interest in FDI. Last
year the AFL-CIO convention adopted a resolution condemning foreign
takeovers and promising support for legislative efforts to curb acquisitions'. 7 Since no major takeover has occurred since then, it is impossible
to determine whether organized labor will maintain its antagonistic attitude toward FDI acquisitions. Nevertheless, this resolution must be considered an important factor, and one ignores the concern of labor at his
peril.
Views on FDI in the United States will necessarily be colored by attitudes toward multinational enterprises in general. As long as multinationals remain generally suspect within politically, economically or intellecFDI at $6 billion to $7 billion by 1980, exclusive of private securities purchases and banking
assets (estimated at $1.5 billion to $2 billion and $12 billion to $16 billion, respectively).
46. Among many New York Times articles on the Copperweld acquisition are Mooney,
To the Barricades!, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1975, §3, at 16, col. 1; Imetal Consent Decree Spurs
Copperweld Deal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1975, at 61, col. 6; Societe Imetal Has Acquired 67%
of Copperweld Corp., N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1975, at 68, col. 1.
47. Resolution No. 257, Eleventh Constitutional Convention of the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Proceedings, San Francisco, California,
Oct. 2-8, 1975.
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tually influential groups, it will be impossible to isolate inward investment
from outward investment. FDI could thus become a component in the
much larger controversy on multinational enterprises and international.
investment.
FDI in the United States has political as well as economic implications.
Multinational enterprises in general face intense pressures from many academic researchers and politicians, as well as from labor. The prospect that
FDI will fade as a public issue is dim even though the intensity of concern
may fluctuate.
IV.

PROSPECTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Regardless of one's position on FDI, it has become obvious that there are
still several areas where congressional action would be desirable or where
such action may be anticipated.
The first is in the area of data collection.48 Information on inward and
outward investment has been collected pursuant to the Bretton Woods
Agreements Act, which authorizes the President to require persons to furnish information which he determines to be essential to comply with requests from the International Monetary Fund for data under Article VIII
of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. 9 The IMF never has given any
specific instructions on what statistics it requires for balance of payments
information, and each country has discretion to determine how the information should be collected. The request for balance of payments information is considered a standing request from the IMF, and data collection
programs, designed to elicit information for the IMF, are clearly authorized. The legal authority to collect information principally for domestic
reasons, however, is dubious. A great deal of information is only indirectly
related to the balance of payments but still is invaluable for analytical
purposes; examples include technology flows, employment patterns, and
pricing practices.
The uncertainty about the statutory authority for the collection of this
type of information and the requirement for a clear congressional statement about the public's need for this data were the reasons for the introduction of S. 2839, the International Investment Survey Act. The bill
would authorize the periodic collection, analysis, and publication of data
on both outward and inward FDI. The measure, if enacted, would have the
dual effect of removing any legal ambiguities and of directing the federal
government to establish permanent, systematic data collection programs.
Falling into this same category would be those bills which would compel
the monitoring of major foreign direct investors. Existing proposals are
48.
49.
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specific in providing for detailed criteria for such a program, but it would
appear that a comprehensive data collection program would implicitly
include a monitoring function, since its establishment necessarily would
entail the identification of significant foreign investors.
A second area in which further Congressional action would be justified
is where existing regulation falls short of its objectives and leaves an incomplete or inequitable regulatory pattern. The outstanding-and thusfar
only known-example of this category occurs in the regulatory treatment
of foreign banks, which have become increasingly important in the American economy.50 The Senate Committee on Banking is currently considering
S. 958, introduced at the request of the Federal Reserve, to provide for the
federal regulation and supervision of foreign bank operations in the United
States. As a result of work performed by a Federal Reserve Committee
established in 1973, the Board of Governors concluded that foreign bank
operations have become significant and that there now should be a national policy on foreign banks operating in the United States and that there
should be a system of federal regulation, supervision, and examination of
those operations. The Federal Reserve told the Committee:
[Tihe present patchwork system of State and Federal regulation has
resulted in illogical differences in the regulatory treatment of domestic
and foreign banks. While difficult to quantify, certain competitive advantages and disadvantages for foreign banks
vis-a-vis domestic banks have
5
occurred as a result of these differences. '
As the Federal Reserve Board has pointed out, the present regulatory
scheme exempts from federal regulation those operations that have the
greatest potential for affecting the nation's economy and its major financial markets. There are numerous advantages for a foreign bank to operate through branch and agency forms of organizations which are not accorded domestic banks. However, foreign banks also suffer from discriminatory provisions which inhibit their operations or impose restraints on
entry into the United States. In the case of the banking industry, therefore,
there is an overwhelming argument to standardize regulation and to end
50. INTERIM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 4, appendix VIII. This paper
describes the major issues and also provides the political background for consideration of the
legislation.
51. Statement by George W. Mitchell, Jan. 28, 1976, Hearings on S. 958 Before the
Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at (1976). The hearings have not been printed at the time
of this writing.
52.
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supra note 4 at 5-6. A discussion of the regulatory structure as it has developed appears in 2
INTERIM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 4 at 33 and in Edwards, Regulation
of Foreign Banking in.the United States: International Reciprocity and Federal-State
Conflicts, 3 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 239 (1974).
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the disparity in the treatment of domestic and foreign banks.
Third, FDI may be significantly affected by legislative action as part of
efforts to change existing regulation of all domestic corporations. As an
example, the Senate Banking Committee has reported out S. 953,53 which
has two separate titles. The first would expand and enforce U. S. antiboycott policy through amendments to the Export Administration Act,
while the second would amend section 13(d)(1) of the Security Exchange
Act of 1934 and add a new subsection to that Act to require disclosure of
additional information from purchasers and stockholders. Among the new
information to be required under this title are citizenship and residence of
the purchaser, provisions clearly directed at foreign owners. The Senate
report54 makes apparent that one of the principal motivations for this title
is concern about foreign ownership, but this information is required only
in the context of greater disclosure from both domestic and foreign owners.
While one may dispute the wisdom of the specific provisions, it is entirely
predictable that FDI regulation will be accorded special attention as new
regulation is enacted.
There are currently before the Congress no bills which are directly related solely to national security. However, to the extent that this is the
most sensitive area of FDI, the possibility of a strong negative response to
FDI in any important defense contractors cannot be dismissed. Indeed,
such an action should be predictable if a takeover of this nature were to
transpire.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Three years after FDI first became a national issue, there is still a lack
of a national consensus on an American FDI policy. One has seen instead
the co-existence of a number of policies and proposals. The passage of time
since the public controversies in 1973 has not brought a retreat from traditional U.S. policy, although this official stance has eroded somewhat.
Numerous factors have caused the weakening of this traditional policy.
First and foremost has been the opposition by certain interest groups which
previously had been indifferent to FDI. This antagonism has been translated directly into congressional concern and legislative proposals. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the volume of FDI has decreased, the hostility of organized labor-at least to acquisitions-promises to keep the
issue before the public.
Second, it has become increasingly clear, the Administration's assurances notwithstanding, that policymakers, researchers, and business analysts know little about the impact of foreign investors on the domestic
53.
54.
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economy. A great deal of information is collected, but it is not coordinated,
centralized or readily usable. Moreover, there are significant gaps in the
data collected, so analyses have not been of a quality nor in such detail
that will induce confidence in the policies which are based on this data.
Experience thusfar does not indicate that existing FDI has had a negative impact on the U. S. economy, although, in the absence of comprehensive information, no absolute judgment is possible. Some geographical
areas may indeed have been negatively affected by FDI-for example, in
the form of additional pollution or microeconomic distortions. Further
study to substantiate such allegations is necessary.
The prior existence of a relatively open-door FDI policy has had both
positive and negative effects. Its principal function has been to discourage
restrictive legislation domestically, but it has also been used to enhance
the effort of the United States to maintain an open global investment
climate. Executive witnesses stress that a liberal domestic policy is necessary to prevent other countries from enacting restrictive policies, particularly against American FDI.
However, U.S. policy has been generally undiscriminatory to the extent
that all FDI has been welcome except for government-owned corporations,
which the Executive has conceded should be scrutinized more closely because they are more susceptible to political manipulation. The Administration has considered FDI policy primarily in terms of protecting U.S.
overseas investment. Notwithstanding the Administration endorsement of
an non-discriminatory, non-preferential policy, it may be desirable for the
American Government to consider welcoming some forms of FDI.
Even without imposing limitations on FDI, there are areas where Congress may act and thereby affect FDI in the United States, especially when
such legislation may be perceived as informational, as ancillary to improvements in general regulation, or as desirable to end inequities and
disparities in current regulation. Consequently, it can be expected that
some future action will be taken by the Congress which will fit under the
rubric of these categories.
Whatever the future of FDI regulation in the United States, it seems safe
to say that the issue will persist in American life for the foreseeable future.
It is only fitting that the United States, having generated so much heated
discussion as a result of its own multinationals, should now go through the
same reappraisal that other countries have undergone for the last several
years.

